College Publications logo   College Publications title  
View Basket
Homepage Contact page
   
 
AiML
Academia Brasileira de Filosofia
Algorithmics
Cadernos de Lógica e Computação
Cadernos de Lógica e Filosofia
Cahiers de Logique et d'Epistemologie
Communication, Mind and Language
Computing
Cuadernos de lógica, Epistemología y Lenguaje
DEON
Dialogues
Economics
Encyclopaedia of Logic
Filosofia
Handbooks
Historia Logicae
IfColog series in Computational Logic
IfColog Lecture series
IfColog Proceedings
Journal of Applied Logics - IfCoLog Journal
About
Editorial Board
Scope of the Journal
Submissions
Forthcoming papers
Journals
Landscapes
Logics for New-Generation AI
Logic and Law
Logic and Semiotics
Logic PhDs
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science
The Logica Yearbook
Neural Computing and Artificial Intelligence
Philosophy
Research
The SILFS series
Studies in Logic
Studies in Talmudic Logic
Systems
Texts in Logic and Reasoning
Texts in Mathematics
Tributes
Other
Digital Downloads
Information for authors
About us
Search for Books
 



Forthcoming papers


Back

Events as Located Situations: Ontological Commitments in the Problem of Individuating Events

B.O. Akinkunmi

One of the sub-problems of the event individuation problem: if $A$ does $x$ by doing $y$, is $A$ doing $x$ the same event as $A$ doing $y$? Although it has been argued in the literature that doing $x$ is a trying and as such, a mental event, the basis for defining the physicality of such actions when they succeed, needs to be defined.

This paper argues that actions that must be done by doing something else are Vendlerian accomplishments and that treating events as located situations enables one to commit to the option in which doing $y$ is a sub-situation of doing $x$. This is done by defining a sufficient condition for inferring that $x$ has been accomplished from the fact that y has been done, which, is when a situation in which y has been done causes another situation in which the culmination of the accomplishment $x$ holds.

By extending the situation theory with intentional predicates, it becomes possible to model $x$ as an intentional or strategic accomplishment and consequently define the sufficient condition for inferring that a situation in which y is done is a plan that resulted in a situation for accomplishing $x$. That condition holds when it is known that agent's intention in carrying out y is to accomplish $x$ and the agent's plan is rational, and the situation characterized by the agent's doing of $y$ causes a situation in which the culmination of $x$ holds.

January 2021






© 2005–2022 College Publications / VFH webmaster